The Mustaḍʿafīn in the Qur’an as Epistemic Subjects: The Shift of Knowledge Authority from the Elite to Marginalized Groups

Abstract

The position of the mustaḍʿafīn (the oppressed/marginalized) in the Qur’an raises an epistemological question about how credibility and epistemic authority are distributed in relations between subordinate groups and elites. Studies of the mustaḍʿafīn have largely framed them in terms of social, political, and religious injustice; consequently, they have not systematically mapped their roles as actors who know, bear witness, recognize truth, and articulate their experiences. This research aims to identify the mustaḍʿafīn’s epistemic agency, map the mechanisms that legitimize and delegitimize knowledge claims in their interactions with elites, and formulate the implications for the Qur’an’s social epistemology. This library-based study employs thematic exegesis (tafsīr mawḍūʿī) with social epistemology as its conceptual framework, utilizing semantic, intratextual, and narrative analyses as analytical tools. The corpus comprises verses containing the linguistic root ḍ-ʿ-f and narratives involving subordinate groups that feature acts of knowing, bearing witness, recognizing truth, making knowledge claims, and elite responses; the study uses both classical and contemporary interpretations to verify the consistency of the readings. The findings reveal three primary patterns. First, the mustaḍʿafīn emerge as epistemic subjects through experience, testimony, collective memory, the recognition of guidance, and the articulation of objections to elite claims. Second, elite authority is constructed through status, power, honor, wealth, and traditional authority—factors that shape credibility before assessing a claim’s validity. In contrast, the legitimacy of the mustaḍʿafīn is determined by their capacity to know, the consistency of their testimony, their receptivity to guidance, and the integrity of their actions. Third, a marginal position provides an epistemic perspective that broadens social knowledge, though it does not guarantee truth. In conclusion, the Qur’an corrects the distribution of credibility. It shifts the basis of legitimacy from social status to epistemic grounds, without transferring the authority of truth from the elite to the mustaḍʿafīn.