



Anthropological Critique of Islamic Philosophy of Transhumanism: An Analysis of the Concepts of *Homo Deus* and '*Abd Allāh*'

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Abstract

The development of transhumanism as a contemporary philosophical and technoscientific movement encourages the redefinition of humanity through biological, cognitive, and moral enhancements, culminating in the concept of *Homo Deus* as a posthuman, autonomous subject. This discourse raises philosophical questions about the nature of humanity, the limits of agency, and the relationship between technology and existential meaning. This study aims to critically analyze the ontological, epistemological, and teleological constructions of *Homo Deus* and evaluate them through the concept of '*Abd Allāh*' in Islamic philosophical anthropology. This research is a literature study with a philosophical-critical and comparative-dialogical approach, employing a conceptual analysis of the main works of transhumanism, especially those of Yuval Noah Harari, as well as the treasures of classical and contemporary Islamic philosophy. The results show that *Homo Deus* is built on a naturalistic-reductionistic ontology that views consciousness as a computational process and the body as an object of technological optimization. Its epistemology is technocentric by placing data, predictability, and algorithmic efficiency as the main parameters of truth. The teleology of transhumanism equates human perfection with expanded control over the body, emotions, and death. In contrast, the concept of '*Abd Allāh*' is rooted in the monotheistic paradigm, which positions humans as relational subjects, ontologically limited, yet valued through moral mandates and ethical responsibilities. This research asserts that Islamic philosophical anthropology offers a conceptual correction to transhumanism by placing human freedom within the horizons of transcendence, ethics, and normative responsibility.

Keywords: Transhumanism; *Homo Deus*; '*Abd Allāh*'; Islamic Philosophy; *Tawhīd*

Abstrak

Perkembangan transhumanisme sebagai gerakan filsafat dan teknosains kontemporer mendorong redefinisi manusia melalui peningkatan biologis, kognitif, dan moral yang bermuara pada konsep *Homo Deus* sebagai subjek otonom pascamanusia. Diskursus tersebut memunculkan persoalan filosofis mengenai hakikat manusia, batas agensi, dan relasi antara teknologi serta makna eksistensial. Penelitian ini bertujuan menganalisis secara kritis konstruksi ontologis, epistemologis, dan teleologis *Homo Deus* serta mengevaluasinya melalui konsep 'Abd Allāh dalam antropologi filsafat Islam. Penelitian ini merupakan studi kepustakaan dengan pendekatan filosofis-kritis dan komparatif-dialogis melalui analisis konseptual terhadap karya-karya utama transhumanisme, khususnya Yuval Noah Harari, serta khazanah filsafat Islam klasik dan kontemporer. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa *Homo Deus* dibangun di atas ontologi naturalistik-reduksionistik yang memandang kesadaran sebagai proses komputasional dan tubuh sebagai objek optimasi teknologis. Epistemologinya bersifat teknosentris dengan menempatkan data, prediktabilitas, dan efisiensi algoritmik sebagai parameter utama kebenaran. Teleologi transhumanisme mengidentikkan kesempurnaan manusia dengan perluasan kontrol terhadap tubuh, emosi, dan kematian. Sebaliknya, konsep 'Abd Allāh berakar pada paradigma tauhid yang memosisikan manusia sebagai subjek relasional, terbatas secara ontologis, namun bernilai melalui amanah moral dan tanggung jawab etis. Penelitian ini menegaskan bahwa antropologi filsafat Islam menawarkan koreksi konseptual terhadap transhumanisme dengan menempatkan kebebasan manusia dalam horizon transendensi, etika, dan tanggung jawab normatif.

Kata Kunci: Transhumanisme; *Homo Deus*; 'Abd Allāh; Filsafat Islam; Tauhid

Introduction

The development of artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, neurotechnology, and human-machine integration has given rise to transhumanism. This paradigm views humans as capable of being enhanced beyond their biological limits through technological intervention. Transhumanism establishes a new anthropology that positions humans as autonomous entities capable of engineering their own bodies, consciousness, and evolution (Nasution, Yuyung, Putri, & Fauzi, 2025). The concept of *Homo Deus* represents a postbiological vision of humanity that seeks to control life, extend lifespans, enhance intelligence, and even postpone death through technological optimization (Harari, 2016). This paradigm shifts the meaning of human perfection from a moral-transcendent dimension to biological performativity and computational capacity.

Islamic philosophical anthropology views humans as integral beings who combine physical, spiritual, intellectual, moral, and transcendental dimensions and as having a transcendent relationship with God. The concept of 'Abd Allah positions humans as ethical subjects whose freedom is bound by divine ontological structures (Chaer & Sukatin, 2022), while the concept of the caliph emphasizes moral responsibility for life and the cosmic order (Mubarak, Eriza, & Lubis, 2024). The tension between humans as creatures subject to ontological limitations and humans as agents who engineer themselves without limits raises serious philosophical questions about human nature, the legitimacy of human enhancement, the meaning

of freedom, and the relationship between technology and human dignity. These issues demand an anthropological critique that is neither anti-technology nor merely evaluative, but capable of assessing the ontological, epistemological, and axiological assumptions underlying the *Homo Deus* narrative.

The acceleration of research into human enhancement technologies demonstrates that transhumanism has moved from futuristic speculation to a concrete global project. The World Health Organization (2021) warns that the use of gene-editing technologies such as CRISPR-Cas9 could lead to the manipulation of fundamental human nature, biological inequality, and genetic exploitation if not governed by strict ethical principles. The World Economic Forum (2025) reports increasing global investment in brain-computer interface technology, generative artificial intelligence, and neurotechnology-based cognitive enhancement, which are projected to transform the structure of work, personal identity, and human social relations. The United Nations Development Program (2025) also asserts that technological acceleration without a moral framework risks widening inequality in access to enhancement, strengthening biological utilitarianism, and reducing humans to performative values measured by cognitive efficiency and productivity. This phenomenon shakes the concept of nature, existential limitations, the relationship between humans and God, and the structure of the meaning of servanthood. The absence of a systematic philosophical-critical framework risks leaving enhancement technology to advance without clear normative boundaries, thereby positioning humans as objects of technical modification who lose their metaphysical and moral orientation.

The study of transhumanism has evolved through various approaches, yet fundamental conceptual gaps persist in the anthropology of Islamic philosophy. Tanton (2025) views transhumanism as a rational project to expand human capacity through technology. However, his argument rests on secular humanism, which positions biological enhancement as evolutionary progress without a metaphysical evaluation of human nature. Al-Kassimi (2023) explains the emergence of *Homo Deus* and dataism as a new phase of civilization, grounded in algorithms and biotechnology. However, his analysis is more historical-cultural than a normative ontological critique. Zou (2024) asserts that human enhancement is a logical continuation of rational evolution aimed at optimizing well-being and cognitive capacity. However, his study fails to examine the theological and moral implications of conceiving of humans as transcendent beings. Iarovaia (2025) criticizes transhumanism as a threat to human identity and individual rights. However, his study focuses on the liberal political dimension and fails to address humankind's metaphysical structure in its entirety.

Muhsin et al. (2026) discuss genetic engineering and enhancement through the *maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* approach. However, their discussion remains normative-juridical and has not reconstructed human anthropology on the basis of the concept

of 'Abd Allāh. Valjevac (2023) examines the concepts of *insan kāmil* and *khalifah* in the Islamic tradition, but does not position them as a systematic critique of the global transhumanism project. All of these studies show that secular approaches, practical bioethics, and political analysis of technology still dominate the discourse on transhumanism. At the same time, the direct dialogue between the concepts of *Homo Deus* and 'Abd Allāh as two opposing anthropological paradigms has not been comprehensively analyzed. The research gap lies in the lack of studies that specifically compare the ontological assumptions, concepts of freedom, structures of existence, and moral orientations of the two paradigms to determine the limits of the legitimacy of human enhancement within Islamic philosophical anthropology.

The research problem formulation in this study is: how Islamic philosophical anthropology critiques the concept of *Homo Deus* in transhumanism, and to what extent the concept of 'Abd Allāh can be an alternative framework for modern technological ethics. The question is elaborated into three analytical foci: the ontological assumptions of transhumanism about humans; the structure of human anthropology in Islamic philosophy; and the ethical and theological implications of comparing the two paradigms for the human enhancement project. This study aims to identify the ontological foundations of transhumanism, reconstruct the concept of 'Abd Allāh as the basis of Islamic philosophical anthropology, and formulate a normative critique of technology-based human enhancement. The study's initial argument is that transhumanism tends to view humans as biological entities that can be technologically modified to optimize capacity. In contrast, Islamic philosophical anthropology views humans as beings with spiritual and moral dimensions and an ontological attachment to God, so that their freedom is not absolute. The theoretical contribution of the study lies in developing a critique of Islamic philosophical anthropology in relation to transhumanism through a systematic dialogue between the concepts of *Homo Deus* and 'Abd Allāh. The practical contribution of the research is to provide a normative framework for the development of technological ethics and Islamic bioethics, and to define the limits of the legitimacy of human enhancement, so that technological innovation remains oriented towards protecting human dignity, justice, and existential integrity.

Method

This research uses a qualitative method grounded in a literature review, with a critical-philosophy paradigm and a comparative-philosophy approach, to analyze the conceptual relationship between *Homo Deus* in transhumanism and the concept of 'Abd Allāh in Islamic philosophical anthropology. The research design was developed through a philosophical-critical and comparative-dialogical analysis, focusing on the ontological dimension of humans, human-technology relations, the concept of freedom, and existential goals. Primary data includes Yuval Noah Harari's *Homo Deus*, Nick Bostrom's writings on human enhancement, and the works of al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā on humans as servants and caliphs. Secondary data were

obtained from peer-reviewed articles on posthumanism, techno-ethics, and contemporary Islamic philosophy, selected for thematic relevance, academic credibility, and publication recency. Data collection was carried out through systematic searches, hermeneutical-contextual reading, and classification of ontological, epistemological, and axiological categories. Data analysis was carried out in stages: the identification of transhumanist assumptions; the conceptual reconstruction of Islamic anthropology; the deconstruction of biological reductionism; the evaluation of argumentative coherence; and the normative synthesis based on *maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* to formulate an integrative model of technological anthropology.

Results and Discussion

Human Ontology in the *Homo Deus* Paradigm

The *Homo Deus* paradigm represents a radical transformation of modern anthropology by reconceptualizing humans as informational-performative entities that no longer possess a fixed ontological nature. Transhumanism differs from classical humanism, which maintains human rationality, dignity, and autonomy as central universal values. This distinction is also evident in critical posthumanism, which dismantles modern anthropocentrism and questions the liberal subject's dominance over nature, the body, and technology. Transhumanism maintains the centrality of humans but shifts it toward a technology-based biological optimization project (Huberman, 2020). This framework rests on a materialistic naturalism that views human existence as a product of evolution, lacking intrinsic teleology. Yuval Noah Harari (2016) formulated this assumption in the thesis that humans are merely biological algorithms that can be reengineered to achieve greater efficiency and capacity. Human ontology shifts from substance to performative flexibility. Identity is understood as an open configuration that can be continually modified through the interventions of biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and cybernetic integration (Hayles, 1999). This shift marks a shift in human metaphysics from being to process, replacing classical teleology with the logic of optimization without a normative endpoint.

Transhumanist evolutionary naturalism constructs a new metaphysics based on information and computation. This framework views reality as a data system that can be processed, measured, and optimized through algorithms (Schussler, 2022). Dataism forms a techno-metaphysics that positions data flows as the primary horizon of knowledge and existence. The body is reduced to a biological signal-processing device, while consciousness is interpreted as the output of neural-computational mechanisms (Adamczyk, 2023). This assumption is closely related to the computational theory of mind, which identifies personal identity in terms of information patterns rather than the existential unity of organisms (Ruiz-Vanoye et al., 2026). Ontological problems arise when computational correlations are treated as identical to subjective experience. Phenomenological consciousness cannot be

fully reduced to algorithmic relations because first-hand experience, intentionality, and self-awareness are not identical to the calculation process. John Searle's (1980) critique of artificial intelligence and David Chalmers's (1996) notion of the hard problem of consciousness demonstrate that the simulation of mental functions does not automatically produce conscious experience. The reduction of humans to data systems represents a categorical leap between technical description and subjective existence.

The conception of humans as open projects gains normative legitimacy through the idea of enhancement, which views biological limitations as technical deficiencies. The body is understood as a material that can be engineered to increase efficiency, productivity, and cognitive capacity (Bostrom, 2003). This view differs from Maurice Merleau-Ponty's (2002) phenomenology of the body, which views the body as a medium of existence and a locus of conscious experience. Transhumanism, on the other hand, transforms the body into an object of technological optimization. Biological enhancement, genetic modification, neuroenhancement, and human-machine integration are presented as stages of rational evolution toward a superior human form (Tomašovičová, 2021). This normative assumption has serious bioethical implications, as human worth begins to be measured based on technological performativity. Subjects who fail to meet standards of optimization are potentially positioned as less valuable forms of existence. This logic opens up space for liberal eugenics, biological stratification, and techno-ableism, which differentiate humans based on access to technological enhancement. The ambition of enhancement demonstrates the transformation of modern anthropology toward a performative paradigm that defines existence by the capacity for optimization, rather than by the ontological dignity inherent in human beings.

The transformation of transhumanist anthropology is also evident through the reconceptualization of human perfection. The classical metaphysical tradition understands perfection as the actualization of potential in accordance with a natural structure and a specific teleological orientation (Zhukova, 2022). The *Homo Deus* paradigm replaces this framework with a model of technological perfection that is progressive, dynamic, and without a final point. Perfection refers to the continuous improvement of biological efficiency and computational capacity. Rationality is reduced to data processing capabilities that can be enhanced through algorithmic integration (Rugani, 2022). This conception implies a redefinition of human autonomy. Autonomy is no longer rooted in the subject's reflective freedom, but rather in the ability to access information systems that predictively determine preferences and actions. Martin Heidegger's (1977) critique of Gestell is relevant to explaining this condition because technology functions as an ontological horizon that shapes how humans understand reality. Algorithmic structures ultimately construct the subject's preferences through recommendation mechanisms, digital surveillance, and behavioral calculations. A paradox arises when the project of

human liberation actually results in systemic dependency on technological networks that determine the existential orientation of modern humans.

The imagination of transhumanist immortality demonstrates a secularized form of eschatology through the notion of mind uploading and extreme lifespan extension. Death is understood as a technical problem that can be deferred through bioengineering and the preservation of consciousness data. This project assumes that personal identity is identical to the continuity of neural information patterns that can be transferred to a non-organic medium (Gaitán, 2019). This assumption is closely related to an informational ontology that separates the self from attachment to the biological body. Critiques of the philosophy of personal identity demonstrate the fundamental flaws of this argument. Derek Parfit (1984) opens the possibility of reducing identity to psychological continuity, but the continuity of mental patterns is not identical to the persistence of the same conscious subject. Data replication produces only copies of information, not the phenomenological continuity of consciousness. The experience of embodied selfhood remains dependent on the integration of body, affection, memory, and temporal awareness that cannot be reduced to algorithmic transmission. The *Homo Deus* paradigm reduces the problem of human existence to a matter of data storage, thereby blurring the ontological distinction between the simulation of consciousness and the continuation of the self as a living subject (Zlotnik & Vansintjan, 2020).

The ontological construction of *Homo Deus* also reveals an internal tension between materialistic reductionism and aspirations for technological transcendence. Transhumanist naturalism asserts that humans are merely products of an evolutionary process, lacking intrinsic purpose. However, the same paradigm provides normative legitimacy for humans to transcend their biological limits to a superior state (Crouch, 2024). The contradiction arises because materialistic descriptions do not provide an adequate normative basis for this project of existential transformation. If humans are merely the product of random evolutionary mechanisms, then the claim that they should be elevated to a postbiological form requires value assumptions that transcend descriptive naturalism. This tension demonstrates that transhumanism implicitly constructs a new metaphysics that replaces the classical position of transcendence. Humans are positioned at the center of value, as the source of legitimacy, and as the goal of their own existential transformation. This structure gives rise to a form of self-deification that ascribes quasi-divine qualities to humans through aspirations for technological omnipotence, total control over the body, and the search for immortality.

The quasi-religious character of transhumanism is evident through the combination of technological soteriology, evolutionary optimism, and a narrative of biological salvation. The promise of human liberation from disease, aging, cognitive limitations, and even death suggests that the transhumanist project offers an eschatological vision of humanity's future. Nick Bostrom (2003) presents the

technological singularity as a moment of radical transformation that allows humans to transcend traditional biological conditions. This narrative resembles a secular religious structure because it presents a savior figure, a horizon of salvation, and the promise of existential transcendence through technology. The difference lies in replacing the metaphysical-transcendent dimension with computational mechanisms and biological engineering. Ontological critique is important because *Homo Deus* often ignores the constitutive dimensions of limitation, dependence, and vulnerability. Efforts to eliminate all limitations may undermine the basic conditions that make human experience possible.

The Ontological and Theological Structure of the Concept of 'Abd Allāh in Islamic Anthropology

The concept of 'Abd Allāh occupies a fundamental position in Islamic philosophical anthropology because human identity is understood as a contingent being whose existence is completely dependent on the Absolute Being. This ontological structure is rooted in the metaphysical distinction between *wajib al-Wujūd* and *mumkin al-Wujūd*, as developed by Ibn Sīnā (1960). Humans do not possess necessary existence, as their existence is always possible and attains actuality only through an ontological relationship with God. This relationship is not an external moral one but rather the condition of possibility for human existence itself. The identity of 'abd (servant), therefore, demonstrates a form of substantial relationality inherent in human nature. This paradigm contrasts with the assumptions of transhumanism, which positions humans as the center of radical autonomy and the source of their own existential legitimacy (Taillandier, 2021). *Homo Deus* presupposes technology's ability to free humans from ontological limitations, whereas the concept of 'abd asserts that limitations mark humans' existential status as contingent beings.

This relational structure is articulated more deeply through the concept of *tashkīk al-Wujūd*, which explains the gradation of existence between Absolute Being and contingent being. The Islamic metaphysical tradition views human existence as an existential manifestation that gradually attains a higher degree of being (Laude, 2024). This perspective positions humans as beings with limited participation in reality, never attaining absolute status. The relation between 'abd and *rabb* demonstrates a permanent form of ontological dependence, not a temporary relationship constructed by a particular culture or normative system. Awareness of the ontological factor produces a rational recognition of human existential limitations while preventing the illusion of self-grounding the subject that dominates the *Homo Deus* paradigm. Islamic anthropology's critique of transhumanism stems from this point, namely, the rejection of the idea that humans can overcome their contingent structure through technological engineering. Biological enhancement efforts may alter human empirical capacities, but cannot erase their ontological status as *mumkin al-Wujūd*.

The spiritual dimension occupies a central position because Islamic anthropology does not reduce humans to mere biological organisms or neurocognitive systems. The concept of the spirit represents a nonmaterial principle that enables reflective consciousness, metaphysical interiority, and openness to transcendent reality. Oliver Leaman (2002) views the rational spirit as the basis of personal identity, distinguishing humans from other material entities. This structure demonstrates that humans can transcend biological determination without eliminating their ontological limitations. This perspective differs fundamentally from transhumanism, which treats consciousness as a computational product and raises the possibility of transferring the mind to an artificial medium (Gaitán, 2019). Islamic anthropology rejects this reduction because human identity rests on the ontological unity of body, soul, and transcendent orientation. The substantial movement of the spirit indicates that humans undergo an existential transformation toward a certain level of perfection without losing their contingent status. Human perfection is the actualization of spiritual potential through an existential orientation toward God (Chittick, 1998).

Awareness of existential limitations lies at the core of the concept of *'abd*, because humans are never sufficient in themselves. Ibn 'Arabī (1980) views contingency as an inherent characteristic of all beings other than God, so limitations are not understood as existential failures, but rather as markers of the ontological structure of beings. The *Homo Deus* paradigm interprets biological limitations as obstacles to be overcome through enhancement technology, genetic engineering, and the integration of artificial intelligence (Zou, 2024). Islamic anthropology, in fact, views the obsession with eliminating limitations as a form of ontological disorientation because humans seek to occupy a position beyond the structure of their own being (Moll, 2023). Awareness of ontological factors does not lead to fatalism because humans retain the capacity for actualization, creativity, and ethical responsibility. Human dignity arises from the ability to correctly understand one's ontological position, not from the ambition to attain quasi-divine status. The structure of *'abd* combines ontological humility and existential nobility through a participatory relationship with God as the source of being. This dialectic produces an anthropological model that rejects nihilism and simultaneously rejects the absolutization of humanity.

The meaning of worship occupies a significant philosophical position because its practice represents the ontological actualization of the *'ubūdiyyah* consciousness. Worship is not merely a normative ritual or a means of attaining religious legitimacy, but rather a form of existential praxis that maintains a correspondence between human nature and its self-actualization. Seyyed Hossein Nasr (1987) understands the body not as a medium for the manifestation of humanity's ontological orientation toward God. Every act of worship articulates the rational recognition that humans receive their existence through a permanent relationship of

dependence on the source of being. This structure demonstrates that metaphysical relationships acquire concrete form through existential discipline. The transhumanist paradigm tends to view the body as a technological material that can be infinitely modified to achieve maximum efficiency and performance (García-Barranquero & Fernández, 2025). Islamic anthropology rejects this instrumentalization because the body possesses symbolic and spiritual dimensions that are integral to human ontological identity. Worship maintains the integration of the physical, spiritual, and teleological dimensions so that humans are not reduced to mere technological subjects.

The relationship between freedom and submission demonstrates a fundamental difference between Islamic anthropology and the modern paradigm of autonomy. Modern philosophical traditions often understand freedom as the ability to determine oneself without transcendent reference, whereas the concept of '*abd*' views authentic freedom as the ability to situate oneself within humanity's ontological structure. Absolute freedom constitutes an ontological contradiction because a contingent being cannot completely separate itself from the source of its existence (Knežević, 2022). Submission to God does not represent irrational heteronomy, but rather an intellectual recognition of the order of reality. This perspective avoids both extremes: total determinism and radical voluntarism. The *Homo Deus* paradigm links freedom to the expansion of technological power over the human body, lifespan, and consciousness. Islamic anthropology views this orientation as problematic because freedom becomes a project of limitless domination, losing its teleological horizon. The structure of '*abd*' actually unites freedom and transcendent direction through the awareness that self-actualization is only possible when humans correctly understand their ontological limitations.

The synthesis of Islamic philosophical anthropology shows that the concept of '*Abd Allāh*' constitutes a coherent ontological structure that integrates divine relations, spiritual dimensions, existential contingency, the practice of worship, and the teleology of human perfection. This paradigm rejects reducing humans to biological subjects or autonomous technological agents because human identity is always bound to an ontological relationship with God, the source of being. The critique of *Homo Deus* stems from a rejection of the assumption that technology can erase human existential limitations or replace the function of transcendence. Islamic anthropology is not hostile to technological development, but it rejects its transformation into a new metaphysical foundation that replaces the structure of '*ubūdiyyah*'. Human potential is still recognized through intellectual capacity, creativity, and freedom of choice, but all of this potential operates within the horizon of ontological contingency. '*Abd Allāh*'s concept ultimately presents an anthropological model that maintains a balance between potential and limitations, freedom and submission, and self-transformation and metaphysical awareness without falling into the absolutization of humankind.

Epistemological Tension between Technological Autonomy and Theological Submission

The epistemic rationality of transhumanism rests on scientism and computational epistemology, which view valid knowledge as arising from empirical observation, mathematical calculation, and intersubjectively verifiable algorithmic predictions (Al-Kassimi, 2023). This paradigm shifts the structure of knowledge production toward a datafication mechanism that assesses reality based on statistical measurability and predictive capacity. Algorithms are positioned as epistemic media that determine relevant variables, validity parameters, and the horizon of interpretation of reality. This structure produces a form of technopositivism that positions computational efficiency as an indicator of rationality. Knowledge is deemed valuable when it can improve the control, optimization, and prediction of human behavior through large-scale data processing (Savić, 2023). Such an epistemic model narrows reality to an object of quantitative calculation, thereby subordinating the dimensions of meaning, intentionality, and normative reflection to the logic of technical performativity, which prioritizes operational success.

This epistemic paradigm develops from the transhumanist belief that human cognitive enhancement can be achieved by integrating biological intelligence and computational systems. This view stems from the assumption of epistemological naturalism, which identifies knowledge as the product of material and calculative processes, without recourse to transcendent metaphysical legitimacy. Algorithmic rationality gains authority because computational systems are deemed capable of generating probabilistic inferences that exceed human reflective capacity (Neubauer, 2021). This form of epistemic delegation gives rise to a tendency toward epistemic reductionism, which reduces knowledge to a statistical information-processing process. Heidegger's (1977) critique demonstrates that this reduction is problematic because correlation in data is not synonymous with understanding meaning. Algorithmic predictions yield only probabilistic patterns and lack the capacity to grasp the moral purpose and existential implications of human action. When technological rationality is treated as the sole source of legitimacy, knowledge loses its reflective dimension, questioning the normative basis of technological optimization.

Islamic epistemology constructs a theory of knowledge through a hierarchical structure that integrates revelation, reason, empirical experience, and intellectual intuition without placing any one element above the others as an absolute authority independent of the divine normative horizon. Osman Bakar (1991) distinguishes among demonstrative knowledge based on *burhān*, empirical knowledge based on *tajribah*, and intuitive knowledge based on *ma'rifah*, thereby preventing epistemic validity from being reduced to mere material verification. Reason gains legitimacy through its capacity to reason reality. However, this capacity is understood to be

limited and requires a normative orientation toward revelation to avoid being trapped in the absolutization of instrumental rationality (Suswita, 2025). This framework rejects the binary dichotomy between revelation and empirical science because material observation remains recognized as a legitimate source of knowledge, provided it does not claim total autonomy from metaphysical principles. Naquib al-Attas (1995) also developed a critique of scientism, asserting that reality transcends quantified objects, so that ethical, teleological, and spiritual dimensions cannot be reduced to mathematical calculations or statistical inference.

Epistemological tensions arise when transhumanism claims value-neutrality through scientific methodologies and algorithmic systems, which are deemed objective because they rely on mathematical calculations. This claim is problematic because every technological design always contains ontological and axiological assumptions that determine measurement priorities, data categories, and success parameters. The algorithmization of knowledge is never value-free because the process of variable selection and model design reflects specific economic, political, and ideological orientations (Kabir et al., 2026). Langdon Winner's (2017) critique suggests that algorithmic neutrality is a methodological myth that conceals power relations in digital knowledge production. Artificial intelligence-based predictive systems often inform social decisions through an efficiency-driven logic, without considering the dimensions of substantive justice or the complexity of human experience. Islamic epistemology rejects a radical separation between facts and values because every cognitive activity is understood to be bound by moral responsibility. Knowledge is not considered axiologically neutral because the process of interpreting reality always occurs within a specific horizon of goals and ethical orientations that determine the legitimacy of the use of reason and technology (Bagasharov et al., 2026).

The absolutization of instrumental rationality transforms knowledge into a continuous optimization mechanism that evaluates humans based on biological productivity and measurable cognitive performance. Transhumanism views increased bodily capacity and intelligence as indicators of rational progress, thus determining technological legitimacy through technical success in extending control over human biological limitations (Zou, 2024). This epistemic model produces techno-solutionism, which assumes all existential problems can be solved through technological innovation and data engineering. Epistemological critiques point out that this approach fails to distinguish between technical capability and the normative legitimacy of technology use. Calculative efficiency does not automatically yield substantive truth because optimization parameters are always determined through certain value assumptions (Farnam, Darehmiraki, & Behdani, 2024). Islamic epistemology offers a corrective structure by positioning reason as a reflective instrument that must consider the moral purpose of knowledge (Lesmana, 2025). Epistemic limits are determined by an awareness of the limitations of human

understanding of reality as a whole. This framework prevents the conversion of humans into objects of technological manipulation, completely subject to the logic of instrumental optimization.

The development of artificial intelligence deepens these tensions by giving rise to forms of epistemic delegation that transfer some of human cognitive authority to computational systems. Machine learning produces predictions based on large-scale statistical correlations, which are often considered more objective than human judgment because they are free of individual emotional bias (Balagopalan et al., 2023). This view assumes that ideal rational decisions should be generated through algorithmic calculations. An Islamic epistemological perspective critiques this total delegation because knowledge is not identical to the ability to predict behavioral patterns. Epistemic understanding requires a reflective awareness of the meaning, purpose, and moral consequences of actions that cannot be reduced to probabilistic processing. Algorithms merely process relations among data without the ability to understand the intentional and teleological dimensions of human experience. This critique does not reject computational technology as a scientific instrument, but rather rejects the transformation of technical systems into final epistemological authorities. Human reason still carries ethical responsibilities that cannot be fully replaced by computational procedures or automated statistical inference.

The fundamental differences between the two paradigms are evident in the concepts of knowledge validity and the structure of truth legitimacy. Transhumanism adopts standards of falsifiability, empirical replication, and mathematical consistency, viewing all knowledge as provisional and always open to experimental revision (Al-Kassimi, 2023). This framework effectively explains material phenomena, but tends toward scientism when empirical standards are imposed as the sole measure of rationality. Islamic epistemology acknowledges the dynamics of empirical knowledge by recognizing *ẓann* and the possibility of observational error. However, it maintains the dimension of *yaqīn* derived from revelation as a stable normative orientation (Syafaq et al., 2023). This structure does not eliminate the function of reason, but rather guides empirical interpretation to avoid being trapped in technological relativism. Epistemological conflict arises because transhumanism derives legitimacy from technical performance and scientific consensus, whereas Islamic epistemology assesses truth by the coherence among reason, empirical experience, and metaphysical principles. These differences demonstrate that the primary conflict is not merely a matter of verification methods, but rather a struggle for epistemic authority over the determination of human nature and the limits of knowledge.

A critical evaluation of technological autonomy reveals the internal paradox of transhumanist rationality. The claim that innovation develops through the objective logic of science contradicts the fact that the direction of research, algorithm design, and the development of artificial intelligence are heavily influenced by global

political-economic interests. The production of digital knowledge occurs through power relations that determine which data are relevant, the research orientation, and the distribution of technological benefits. A critique of Islamic epistemology highlights the importance of moral responsibility to prevent knowledge from becoming an instrument of technological domination. Revelation serves as a normative horizon that corrects the tendency to absolutize reason and prevents the reduction of humans to mere biological-computational entities. The epistemological tension between transhumanism and the concept of *'Abd Allāh* ultimately reveals two distinct paradigms regarding the legitimacy of the source of knowledge, the limits of reason's authority, and the purpose of technological use. Transhumanism affirms the sovereignty of technical rationality as the foundation of human progress. At the same time, Islamic epistemology upholds the integration of reason and revelation to safeguard the moral, metaphysical, and existential dimensions of human knowledge.

Teleological Critique: The Meaning of Perfection between *Homo Deus* and *'Abd Allāh*

A teleological critique of the *Homo Deus* paradigm demands a deeper reading of the transformation of modern humans' existential goals. Transhumanism transforms the structure of human teleology through the idea of perpetual enhancement, which positions endless optimization as the primary normative horizon. This orientation is rooted in the legacy of Promethean humanism and modern technological rationality, which view humans as open-ended projects that can be engineered without fixed limits (García-Barranquero & Fernández, 2025). The body, consciousness, and affection are reduced to operational entities that can be modified through genetic engineering, neurotechnology, artificial intelligence, and cybernetic integration. This perspective produces a mastery-based conception of perfection that prioritizes biological contingency and existential vulnerability. Death, suffering, and finitude are positioned as technical problems awaiting scientific solutions. *Homo Deus* teleology aims to optimize performativity through continuous self-control. Such a goal structure shifts the meaning of life toward capacity management without a stable normative endpoint.

The project of human enhancement has broader philosophical consequences than mere technological innovation. The logic of enhancement constructs a concept of selfhood based on the flexibility of identity and the ability to modify it without limits, thus depriving human nature of its fixed ontological foundation (Desmond, 2022). Critiques of the philosophy of technology demonstrate that modern instrumental rationality tends to transform reality into an object of calculation and control (Mbembe, 2021). Heidegger (1977) explained this phenomenon through the concept of *Gestell*, a technological perspective that positions existence as a ready-to-use resource. The *Homo Deus* framework extends this logic to the human body and consciousness itself. Perfection is understood as an escalation of capacity that

constantly moves toward new standards. Teleological problems arise when the purpose of life loses its substantive finality and becomes a process of permanent optimization. This condition has the potential to give rise to existential nihilism because the desire for improvement never achieves full meaning. Increased capacity actually raises expectations and prolongs the cycle of dissatisfaction by reproducing ever-growing new needs.

The *'Abd Allāh* paradigm offers a different teleological structure, orienting *'ubūdiyyah* toward the ontological relationship with God as the ultimate goal of human existence. Islamic anthropology views humans as relational beings who derive meaning through connection with a transcendent source. Perfection is measured by the actualization of one's natural disposition, moral integrity, and the depth of spiritual awareness (Vicini & Di Puppo, 2024). The concept of *'ubūdiyyah* directs humans toward *takarrub* as a form of vertical self-transcendence that transcends self-affirmation. This framework generates teleological stability because value orientations are independent of fluctuations in individual preferences or technological change. Al-Fārabi (1995) posits that happiness is not merely an affective experience but an existential condition arising from intellectual, ethical, and spiritual perfection. This teleological horizon rejects reducing humans to a mere project of biological performativity.

The fundamental difference between *Homo Deus* and *'Abd Allāh* is evident in their conceptions of happiness. Transhumanism constructs happiness as the optimization of subjective experience through neurochemical engineering, emotional modification, and the elimination of biological suffering. Happiness is understood as an affective state that can be programmed through algorithmic intervention and neurotechnology. This framework is closely related to neurocapitalism, which transforms mental well-being into an object of technological calculation. Human experience is reduced to emotional data that can be manipulated for efficiency and psychological stability. An Islamic anthropological perspective rejects this hedonistic reduction by positioning *sa'ādah* as the harmony of the soul with transcendent truth. Happiness is not synonymous with permanent comfort, but rather an inner order formed through ethical and spiritual relationships. Suffering is not understood as an ideal state but as a purifying dimension that allows for moral reflection and deeper self-awareness. This concept holds that the meaning of existence cannot be reduced to maximizing positive sensations or eliminating all human discomfort.

The teleological perspective of transhumanism reaches its most radical form through the project of immortality and the elimination of death. Mind-uploading, digital immortality, and extreme life extension demonstrate attempts to redefine salvation as the continuity of consciousness without temporal limits. Salvation is understood through mitigating biological risks and eliminating existential threats previously considered natural (Magerstädt, 2024). This orientation gives rise to

techno-eschatology, which replaces metaphysical horizons with scientific solutions. Philosophical problems arise when death is positioned solely as a technical failure. Chang et al. (2025) demonstrate that mortality actually shapes the intensity of meaning and urgency of human action. The finality of time generates an awareness of responsibility, limitations, and moral reflection on life. The indefinite postponement of death can weaken the structure of ethical urgency, as the act loses the horizon of finality that gives it existential weight. Technological immortality ultimately risks prolonging biological existence without providing an adequate orientation to meaning.

The concept of *falāḥ* in Islamic anthropology presents a fundamentally different understanding of salvation. Salvation is understood as the successful maintenance of an existential relationship with God through moral responsibility and eschatological awareness. In contrast, death is understood as a transition to ontological accountability that gives meaning to human actions (Kharazmi & Ghasemitari, 2021). This teleological structure establishes a close relationship between worldly temporality and the afterlife, thereby conferring a consistent ethical direction on life. *Falāḥ* does not reject the development of science or technology, but places innovation within the horizon of benefit and moral accountability. Islamic anthropology continues to open up space for strengthening human capacity through the concept of *isti'mār al-Arḍ* and the development of knowledge. Still, it rejects the absolutization of technology as the source of final salvation (Nasr, 2001). This perspective prevents humans from being transformed into narcissistic entities that center meaning on technological superiority. The vertical relationship with God establishes a normative boundary that balances the development of human abilities, social responsibility, and awareness of human ontological limitations.

The most fundamental tension between *Homo Deus* and 'Abd Allāh lies in the concept of self-transcendence. Transhumanism defines transcendence as overcoming biological limits through technological innovation and the engineering of human capabilities. This transcendence is horizontal because it moves along the escalation of capacity without reference to a reality beyond humans themselves. Humans become the center of value determination and the object of engineering without fixed absolute standards. This situation has the potential to trigger a crisis of normative legitimacy as standards of perfection shift in response to the dynamics of technological power and the global market. 'Abd Allāh's anthropology understands self-transcendence as deepening humility, controlling the ego, and strengthening ethical responsibility towards God. Vertical transcendence allows humans to transcend narcissistic interests without losing their orientation to meaning. Perfection is not synonymous with biological superiority, but rather a moral, intellectual, and spiritual integration that maintains a balance between human capabilities and ontological limitations.

The teleological conflict between *Homo Deus* and 'Abd Allāh demonstrates the struggle between two different horizons of meaning regarding the ultimate goal of human existence. Transhumanism offers the capacity to optimize, technological mastery, and immortality as a form of liberation from biological limitations for modern humans. This paradigm successfully presents a progressive vision of the human future. Still, it faces fundamental problems related to the legitimacy of values, the finality of goals, and the stability of existential meaning. Perpetual enhancement produces an open teleological structure that is constantly in motion without a point of normative fulfillment. Islamic anthropology presents an alternative through 'ubūdiyyah, which integrates the development of human capabilities with a transcendent orientation, moral accountability, and eschatological awareness. Perfection is understood as the perfection of the ontological relationship between humans and God, not simply the escalation of technological power. This perspective allows for a more comprehensive critique of *Homo Deus* by questioning not only the effectiveness of technology but also the existential direction that shapes the meaning of modern humans.

Conclusion

The encounter between transhumanism and Islamic philosophical anthropology shows that the construction of *Homo Deus* rests on the assumption that humans are entities that can be engineered to an infinite degree through technological optimization, whereas the concept of 'Abd Allāh positions humans as moral subjects bound by transcendent relations, ethical responsibility, and an orientation towards spiritual perfection. The main findings emphasize that the technological rationality of transhumanism tends to reduce the ontological dimension of humans to issues of biological performativity and cognitive efficiency, including through the legitimacy of bioengineering, artificial intelligence, and the enhancement of bodily capacity. At the same time, Islamic anthropology views technology as an ethical instrument that must submit to the authority of revelation and the goal of public welfare. This formulation enriches the development of contemporary Islamic philosophy while providing an evaluative framework for modern human enhancement practices. Its practical implications lay the ethical foundation for the development of artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, and biotechnology, ensuring that these fields remain oriented towards human dignity and socio-religious responsibility. The limitations of this study lie in its conceptual-normative approach, which has not yet encompassed the variety of views within Islamic schools of thought or the empirical responses of Muslim communities to human enhancement technologies. Further research agendas should be directed towards comparative studies across traditions of technological ethics, as well as towards empirical qualitative approaches through interviews, digital discourse analysis, and studies of contemporary Muslim intellectual reception.

Acknowledgments

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Author Contribution Statement

MH contributed to the conceptualization of the research, the formulation of the argumentative framework, the drafting of the manuscript, the coordination of the writing process, and correspondence with the editor. OA was involved in data collection and verification, literature search, and refinement of the theoretical foundation. MO contributed to data analysis, interpretation of findings, and a critical review of the manuscript's substance to strengthen the argument's accuracy. IA played a role in language editing, checking the consistency of citations and writing format, and final validation of the manuscript before approval for publication. All authors participated in the discussion of the results, reviewed the final version of the manuscript, and approved the manuscript for publication.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest of any kind related to the preparation, implementation, analysis, writing, or publication of this manuscript. No financial, professional, institutional, or personal relationships exist that could affect the objectivity, integrity, or interpretation of the results and discussion presented. The entire research and writing process was conducted independently, guided by academic considerations and applicable scientific ethical standards.

AI Usage Statement

The authors declare that artificial intelligence (AI) technology was used in the preparation of this manuscript only to a limited extent to assist in improving language quality, grammar correction, editing, and formatting. The use of AI did not include problem formulation, conceptualization, concept development, data collection and interpretation, analysis, scientific argumentation, or conclusion drawing. All research results, findings, ideas, analyses, interpretations, views, and conclusions presented in this article are the sole responsibility of the authors. They are derived from their own intellectual processes and academic judgment. The authors have also reviewed and verified the entire contents of the manuscript to ensure accuracy, scientific integrity, and compliance with applicable publication ethics standards.

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